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When nationalists superseded the ruling communists in the lands of the former 
Yugoslavia in 1990, religious believers were freed from the few remaining constraints 
to practice their faith. Many in the West hoped that the post-communist denizens of 
democracy would allow religious freedom while simultaneously building secular, 
democratic states free from the partisan influences of organized religion. Those hopes 
went unfulfilled. It soon became apparent that leaders of religious communities in 
Southeast Europe yearned for political influence in addition to their spiritual duties. 
Religious leaders have since proven to be among the most stalwart partisans of 
nationalism and in some cases have emerged as major threats to stability and barriers 
to reconciliation. 
In this essay I will review the historical evolution and contemporary state of relations 
between nationalism and the religious communities of Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians in the post-socialist era, focusing on the former Yugoslav areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo. I argue that faith has been an invaluable handmaiden to 
nationalists in acquiring and retaining political power, but that religious communities 
have consistently acted subordinately to nationalist political parties in both lands. 
Religious communities have been stalking horses for nationalism and have found little 
reason, other than direct challenges to their own jurisdiction, to curb extremism in 
their own ranks.  
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
Since 1990, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have shared a progression of historical 
developments: nationalist political mobilization, forcible spatial segregation along 
ethnic lines, ethnic cleansing and genocide, armed conflict, negotiated peace 
agreements, international supervisory regimes, rampant corruption, and the gradual 
but alarming introduction of Islamic fundamentalism. Although the violent breakup of 
Yugoslavia began with armed conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo have suffered the most in the wars accompanying Yugoslavia’s demise. 
The peoples of both areas have experienced the complex interaction of faith and 
nation since the waning days of Yugoslavia’s existence.  
Both areas are home to populations of mixed national and religious identity, but their 
populations differ substantially. Serbs inhabit both areas, but in neither area are they 
the dominant group. As of 1991 (the last year of a full census in either area), 
Albanians made up 82% of Kosovo’s population of 1,954,747, Serbs made up 10%, 
and a scattering of other groups accounted for the remaining 8%. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, unlike in Kosovo, no single nation commanded an absolute majority. Of 
4,354,911 inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17% were Croats (generally associated 
with Catholicism), 31% were Serbs (generally associated with Serbian Orthodoxy), 
44% were Bosnian Muslims (generally associated with Islam), and the remaining 8% 
consisted of Yugoslavs and “Others.” In 1993, to prevent being mistaken for simply a 
religious community, leaders of the Bosnian Muslims voted to change their group’s 
name to “Bosniak,” the term used hereafter in this essay. International organizations 
accepted the new designation over the next few years, bringing closure to the group’s 
quest to achieve formal recognition as a secular nationality that had begun in 
Yugoslavia in the 1960s.  
Religion and Popular Mobilization in Late Socialist Yugoslavia  
In the 1980s, political entrepreneurs turned to mass mobilization to override systemic 
dysfunction and gridlock in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Albanian students in Kosovo 
organized strikes and demonstrations in 1981. Throughout the 1980s, syndicates 
sponsored a growing number of strikes and brought workers’ grievances directly to 
the authorities by organizing demonstrations in republic capitals. Political 
entrepreneurs were not far behind the students and workers. Slobodan Milošević, 
fresh from a victory over rivals in the League of Communists of Serbia, organized 
serial demonstrations known as the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in 1988-1989 by 
focusing discontent on the alleged plight of Serbs in Kosovo. 
Mobilization in this pre-democratic era was opportunistic and instrumental: Political 
entrepreneurs convened gatherings to focus inchoate popular discontent on specific 
causes and thereby gain the loyalty of previously mute constituencies. Milošević 
aroused Serbs with tales of Serb oppression at the hands of Albanians in Kosovo, but 
he bused demonstrators to two locations that had nothing to do with Kosovo: 
Podgorica and Novi Sad, the capitals of Montenegro and Vojvodina, respectively, 
each of which held one vote on the eight-member Yugoslav federal presidency. After 
passing constitutional amendments in March 1989 that revoked the autonomy of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, Milošević imposed a police state on Kosovo. He flooded 
Kosovo with Serbian security forces and dismissed most Albanians employed in the 
social sector, replacing them with Serbs or Roma. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church helped advance Milošević’s agenda with its own 
mobilization campaigns that paralleled the anti-bureaucratic revolution. The church 
used these campaigns to accentuate its self-assigned role as the creator and custodian 
of all that was precious to Serbs. In 1989, church officials removed the earthly 
remains of Prince Lazar, Serbian hero of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, from the Serbian 
Orthodox Patriarchal Church in Belgrade and paraded his remains on a tour of 
Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. 
The procession served to link the secular and religious cores of Serbianism – Belgrade 
and Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo – with peripheral Serb communities in 
Yugoslavia’s “near abroad.” In a second mobilization, in summer 1991 the remains of 
Serb victims of the Second World War were exhumed from caves in Herzegovina and 
reburied in Belgrade. Like Lazar’s funeral procession, the reburials served to bring the 
Serb periphery back into contact with its spiritual and political centers. In both 
campaigns, the church reasserted its historical role as a reservoir of Serb symbols and 
proponent of the political unification of all Serbs.  
Serbian Orthodox Church leaders in Serbia and Kosovo embraced Serbia’s drive to 
reassert political and military authority in Kosovo. Based on Serbian Orthodox 
monasteries built in Kosovo in the Middle Ages, church officials argued that Kosovo 
was the church’s spiritual capital, and that a state church such as theirs could never 
allow its center to be in a foreign land. With these and other convergences of political 
and religious interests, the Serbian Orthodox Church acted in the 1990s as a critical 
but subordinate actor in Serb nationalism in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
Croatia. 
The South Slavs: Religious Loyalties and National Identity 
By the 1840s, nationalism among South Slavs had begun to develop irreversibly along 
religious fault lines. Among Christian communities, church and nation were closely 
linked. The Catholic Church and its high officials were major players in Croatian 
nationalism, and the Serbian Orthodox Church promoted Serb nationalist goals. 
Following the nineteenth century historical pattern, but under very different 
circumstances, political organizers in the 1990s looked to the church to help 
reanimate Serb culture and advance political claims. Radovan Karadžić, the first 
president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, complained that Serb culture had atrophied under communism, 
particularly “where the Serbian Orthodox Church was unable to carry out its 
activities,” so it would “take some time for Serbs to become true Serbs in a] cultural 
and political sense, in areas where the Church was not permitted (to function).” 
Founders of the SDS called for “cooperation with the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
its equal inclusion in the life of the Serb people.”  
Like the Bosnian Serbs, Bosniak leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina formed one dominant 
nationalist party in 1990 to compete in the multiparty elections held in November of 
that year. They identified their new organization, the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA – Stranka demokratske akcije) as a “party of citizens and peoples of the Muslim 
cultural-historical circle.” Much like the Bosnian Serbs of the SDS, they embraced 
democracy, denounced communism, and rejoiced at the “end of a (single) party 
monopoly and its result, a party state.” SDA party leaders did not specifically mention 
the Islamic community in their party’s program, but they called for “complete 
freedom of activity for all religions in Yugoslavia and full autonomy of their religious 
communities” and demanded “return of seized property of religious communities and 
their institution (vakufs and endowments).” They also requested the availability of 
“food in the army, hospitals and jails in accord with religious regulations for citizen-
believers.” The party supported “maintaining Yugoslavia as a free community of 
sovereign nations and republics within existing federal boundaries” and urged respect 
for the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the “national particularities of the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims.” The program explicitly supported a democratic 
state and contained nothing to indicate sympathy for the staples of Islamic 
fundamentalism such as forming an Islamic state or implementing Islamic legal codes 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The election campaigns of 1990 brought together the secular and religious leaders of 
each major nationality in campaigns to lead their communities and oppose the 
reformed communist parties. Nationalists resurrected religious and national symbols 
that had been taboo under socialism, infused old symbols with new meanings, and 
invented some new ones. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, religious officials lent support to 
the nationalist parties. Hodžas and muftis rallied Muslims to vote for the SDA, headed 
by Alija Izetbegović. Most Franciscans in Herzegovina, and many Catholic priests, 
supported the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica). 
Orthodox priests supported Serb nationalist parties, and many ended up supporting 
Karadžić and the SDS.  
Albanians: Religious Divisions and National Unity 
 
The Albanians of Kosovo emerged from communism with a profile different from the 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. Unlike the South Slavs, whose national divisions 
developed along religious fault lines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Albanians in the late nineteenth century articulated themselves as a single, unified 
nation of those who spoke the Albanian language whatever their religious affiliation. 
Albanians necessarily embraced religious diversity as part of their drive to define their 
national identity. They respected but superseded the differences that separated 
Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox. Whereas Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks drew 
heavily upon religion and religious traditions to strengthen their respective national 
identities, Albanians stood the risk of being divided by recourse to religion. 
Additionally, Albanians became increasingly secularized in the twentieth century, 
particularly in urban areas and particularly during the decades of communist rule. One 
might therefore expect that Albanian nationalists would be disinclined to ally with 
religious communities. 
However, Albanians in Kosovo are almost all Muslims by faith or religious heritage: 
only a few thousand are Catholic by religion, and there are no Orthodox Albanians to 
speak of in Kosovo. Therefore, despite Albanians’ religious pluralism and secularism, 
the Islamic community within Kosovo is mostly an Albanian institution, and it 
stalwartly supports Albanian nationalist values. Its leaders attach great importance to 
building and rebuilding mosques, and they see themselves as protectors of those few 
Albanians living in enclaves in the Serb-majority northern area of Mitrovica. For all 
the secularism among urban Albanians in Kosovo, the Islamic community is still a 
significant pillar of Albanian nationalism.  
In their choice of national heroes, Albanians have demonstrated that religious belief is 
welcome in Albanian patriots. Albanians highlight two figures as avatars of their 
national values: Skandarbeg, the 16th century hero of Albanian resistance to Ottoman 
invaders, and Mother Teresa, a Nobel Prize-winning 20th century Albanian born in 
Skopje, Macedonia. These two figures together validate religious diversity within 
Albanian culture while highlighting qualities considered essential to Albanian 
national identity. Skandarbeg’s personal history demonstrates the pre-eminence of 
Albanian identity over religious affiliation. Born a Catholic, he converted to Islam and 
become a general in the Ottoman Army, but he defected to lead an Albanian uprising 
against the Ottomans and returned to the Christian faith. He is consistently portrayed 
as a dominant male and a fierce warrior, while Mother Theresa appears as humble, 
obedient, and compassionate. Representations of Skanderbeg are typically 
monumental, while Mother Teresa is usually portrayed in life-size statues, diminutive 
in comparison to the fierce, imposing images of Skandarbeg. 
Like the three major nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albanians in Kosovo rallied 
around a single charismatic leader and a single dominant political party as free 
elections approached, but religion was less influential among Kosovar Albanians. 
Ibrahim Rugova, a highly-regarded scholar, literary critic, and president of the League 
of Writers of Kosovo, became president of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK - 
Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) when it was formed in December 1989 and dominated 
the party until his death in 2006. When Milošević’s security forces turned Albania 
into a Serb-controlled police state, the pacifistically-inclined Rugova led Kosovar 
Albanians in creating a parallel or “shadow” state that educated Albanian youth and 
provided basic medical and administrative services to the majority Albanian 
population. At a time when other nationalists in the former Yugoslavia were acquiring 
arms in preparation for war, the Albanian parallel state was the most humane and least 
confrontational response to nationalist rivalry in the region. The parallel Albanian 
state functioned with greater or lesser effect for nine years, but it failed to produce 
results among foreign diplomats and policy-makers in ways achieved by armed 
nationalists elsewhere in the region. With little international attention on the plight of 
Kosovar Albanians under Milošević’s rule, Rugova and the LDK found themselves 
challenged in the latter half of the 1990s by Kosovar Albanians who favored resisting 
Serb security forces by violent means. 
Religion and National Mobilization in War 
War came to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and to Kosovo in 1999. The causes and 
nature of those wars is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that in 
both wars, the Serbian government based in Belgrade, either directly or indirectly, 
supported violent campaigns to kill and expel non-Serbs. Religious communities were 
vital contributors to the war efforts of their respective national movements. Even 
before war began, each nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was compelled to 
seek outside support in manpower and materiel in the life-and-death struggle for 
territory. From summer 1991 to winter 1995, the parties mobilized people and 
materiel for the primary purpose of fighting more effectively. Serbia provided as 
much as 90% of the financial resources for the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS – 
Vojska Republike Srpske); Croatia provided the Croatian Defense Council (HVO - 
Hrvatske vijeće obrane) with command and staff expertise, particularly in the 1995 
campaigns that drove Serb forces from Croatia.  
The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH - Armija Republike Bosne 
i Hercegovine), capitalizing on the huge number of Bosniak refugees and displaced 
persons driven from their homes by Serb and Croat armed forces, was the most 
successful recruiter among the military forces. Nevertheless, the ARBiH accepted 
several thousand foreign Muslim fighters in its ranks. Most were Arabic speakers 
from countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and many had honed their 
fighting skills in the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation in the 1980s. The 
“mujahedin,” as they became known, were only nominally under control of the 
ARBiH for much of the war, and their atrocities against civilians led to charges of war 
crimes against their commanders. Most never blended into Bosnian society, but 
several hundred mujahedin married Bosniak women and acquired Bosnian passports. 
In violation of the Dayton Agreement, several hundred remained in Bosnia after the 
war, living mainly in villages from which Bosnian Serbs had fled or been expelled. 
Bosnians of all nations attach great significance to houses of worship as symbolic 
manifestations of their national identity and claims to residence. In wartime, armed 
nationalists attacked mosques and churches with the intent of destroying the national 
symbols of other national groups. Bosnian Serb nationalists, in pursuing their plan to 
establish an ethnically pure state and wipe out traces of other groups, destroyed most 
mosques in areas they controlled, leaving the territory of the Republika Srpska largely 
devoid of Islamic religious structures. Croatian forces destroyed many mosques and 
some Serbian Orthodox institutions, most notably the defenseless Žitomislići Serbian 
Orthodox Monastery. Only Bosniaks undertook no systematic campaign to destroy 
others’ houses of worship. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Srebrenica, a town that 
became a haven for thousands of Bosniak refugees and was besieged by Serb forces 
through much of the war, remained intact and undamaged, while the historic White 
Mosque only a hundred meters away was annihilated once Serb nationalists 
conquered the city. The New Serbian Orthodox Church in Sarajevo was damaged, not 
by Bosniaks who had access to it for four years, but by Serb nationalist snipers who 
shot out most of the windows in its cupola. It would later be restored with the 
financial assistance of the government of Greece. 
The Bosnian war relegated to oblivion the less violent struggle in Kosovo between 
Serbian security forces and the LDK-sponsored underground state. When the 
international community failed to address Kosovar Albanian grievances at peace talks 
in Dayton in Fall 1995, Albanians in Kosovo began to doubt the efficacy of non-
violent resistance as a strategy to draw international attention to their grievances. The 
implosion of the Albanian government in 1997 (owing to the collapse of a pyramid 
scheme) left that country’s armories unguarded, and hundreds of thousands of 
weapons came available to Kosovar Albanians. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; 
Albanian UÇK – Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) was founded in 1993 but remained an 
embryonic assemblage of warriors until 1997, when its members launched sporadic 
attacks on Serbian policemen and police stations with the benefit of donations from 
abroad and arms from the arsenals of Albania. Serbian security forces reacted harshly 
to KLA attacks by retaliating against Albanian civilians, wiping out an entire clan in 
1998 and entire villages in early 1999.  
Neither the LDK nor the KLA’s political wing, the Democratic Party of Kosovo 
(PDK – Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) had any use for Islamic fundamentalism, as 
some ideologues posing as “experts” have irresponsibly alleged. On the contrary, the 
increasingly violent confrontation between Milošević’s thugs and the KLA was a 
hauntingly familiar early warning to western policy-makers of a possible Milošević-
inspired ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Serbs. US and European diplomats 
demanded that Milošević withdraw his forces from Kosovo and allow international 
peacekeepers to supervise the province. When he refused, NATO undertook aerial 
assaults that struck targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Republic of Serbia. 
Milošević retaliated with a vengeance, unleashing Serbian security forces to drive 
over half the Albanian population from Kosovo in a matter of weeks. At the same 
time, the KLA made gains in their fighting against Serbian security forces. After 78 
days of NATO bombing attacks and Serbian ethnic cleansing, Milošević capitulated 
and concluded a peace agreement. Security Council Resolution 1244, passed on June 
10, 1999, cleared the way for Kosovo to be administered by UNMIK (United Nations 
Interim Mission in Kosovo) while maintaining the legal fiction that Kosovo was a 
province of Serbia. 
Neither the Bosnian nor the Kosovo conflict was a religious war, but religious 
symbols were seen by many actors as targets worthy of destruction. Serbian security 
forces in Kosovo destroyed hundreds of mosques during the 78 day war, and after a 
cease-fire was declared and Serbian security forces withdrew, armed Albanians 
destroyed large numbers of Serbian Orthodox churches and institutions. The 
campaigns of destruction brought the Islamic and Serbian Orthodox religious 
communities into closer alignment (if that was possible) with their respective national 
movements.  
Symbolic Sublimation: Continuation of Conflict by Other Means 
The nationalist parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo emerged from war more 
powerful than ever. They sought to continue fueling interethnic tensions and inducing 
fear in their own followers, but were forbidden by peace agreements and international 
peacekeepers from waging war. Instead, they and their religious communities diverted 
their efforts into symbolic interethnic rivalry, a process I call “symbolic sublimation.” 
Religious leaders revived old holidays and declared new ones on occasions of key 
battles and landmark dates in the state-forming narrative. They raised money to 
reconstruct destroyed churches and mosques, and religious communities engaged in 
what my colleague Andras Riedlmayer refers to as the “space race.” Altitude – having 
the tallest manmade structure within view – equates to symbolic supremacy in this 
race, which thrives on contending symbols within visual proximity of one another. In 
Kosovo, some memorialism is secular, centered on monuments to victims of Serb 
oppression and those who served in the KLA, but as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many 
houses of worship have been restored or built anew by the Islamic community or the 
Serbian Orthodox Church.  
Driven by imperatives of symbolic sublimation, Bosniak nationalist leaders deepened 
their dependence on external aid in the post-war years. Islamic countries took turns 
financing the building and rebuilding of hundreds of mosques, first in the Muslim-
majority areas of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and then (after the dawn of 
the new century) in areas where Serbs and Croats had expelled Bosniaks in the war of 
1992-1995. Most mosques have been constructed or reconstructed in a modern style 
imported from the Middle East, with sleek lines, synthetic building materials, and 
towering minarets. The new mosques and cultural centers stand in stark visual 
contrast to the wood-and-stone simplicity of traditional Ottoman-inspired mosques. 
Many Bosnians resent the mosques’ obvious architectural message of subordination to 
foreign Islamic interests. But most Bosniaks also see mosques as visual embodiments 
of their community’s claim to inhabit the land, and rebuilt mosques have contributed 
to a sense among Bosniak refugees and displaced persons that it was safe to return to 
their former homes. Refugees and displaced persons have returned in substantial 
numbers to many areas in the Republika Srpska from which they were expelled, but 
rarely without reconstructing a destroyed mosque or constructing one anew. 
Islamic Fundamentalism 
With Bosniaks relying on funds from other Islamic states to rebuild mosques and 
schools, the authorities of some of those states have exploited Bosniaks’ dependence 
to promote the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, principally through sponsoring the 
movement known in the periodical press as Wahhabism. Only a small percentage of 
Wahhabis are committed to using violence, but they include many converts who 
sympathize with the use of violence by others. Even with the aid of powerful state 
sponsors, Wahhabis have failed to win more than a few thousand converts in 
Southeast Europe. Most informed observers agree that they number somewhere in the 
low thousands in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the hundreds in Kosovo, so we may 
dismiss the wildly speculative allegations that almost all Muslims in the region have 
turned to fundamentalist beliefs. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Wahhabis 
are socially ostracized and politically marginalized. The vast majority of Bosniaks and 
Kosovar Muslim Albanians are dismayed by the very sight of Wahhabis, recognizable 
by their shaved heads, untrimmed beards, and short pants.  
The Wahhabist movement is essentially an aggressive recruitment campaign led from 
Islamic centers in Vienna and several Middle Eastern Arab countries. Wahhabis have 
won control of several schools and mosques in a number of towns in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It is tempting to see new and rebuilt Middle Eastern style mosques as 
manifestations of Wahhabism, but Wahhabis have intruded into only a few such 
mosques, leaving the correlation between modern mosque architecture and Wahhabist 
influence subject to doubt. Many Bosniaks, fearful that Wahhabism will weaken and 
discredit their traditions, have increasingly challenged the Wahhabi presence in their 
land. Most Albanian nationalists in Kosovo likewise abhor Wahhabism as alien to 
their national character and fear that it will crush their hopes for integration into 
Europe.  
After years of acquiescence to fundamentalists’ inroads into mosques, schools, and 
cultural centers, the Islamic community of Bosnia-Herzegovina began in early 2007 to 
confront Wahhabis directly. In January 2007, Wahhabis in the northeast Bosnian town 
of Kalesija attempted to take over a local mosque but were driven out by local 
Bosniak believers. Leading the Wahhabis was a native of Kalesija, Jusuf Barčić, who 
had left Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, studied in Saudi Arabia, and returned in 
1996 dedicated to spreading Wahhabism.  
In February 2007 Barčić sought to enter Sarajevo’s monumental Gazi Husrevbeg 
mosque, built in the seventeenth century and valued by all Bosniaks as a central 
institution of their faith. Traditionalists physically contested Barčić’s entry, and the 
Sarajevo Cantonal police were called to separate the contending factions. Sadrudin 
Iserić, imam of the Gazi Husrevbeg mosque, voiced widely-held Bosniak views in 
announcing that Wahhabis would no longer be allowed to use the mosque for lectures: 
“The people are frightened, and already there are those who stay away from prayers 
on Thursday to avoid meeting them. All that we have accomplished for 600 years they 
now want to destroy.”  
On Thursday, February 22, 2007, the Wahhabis again attempted to gather in the Gazi 
Husrevbeg mosque but were confined to the courtyard, where they held a service and 
lecture observed by more reporters (about 50) than followers (around 20). Barčić 
railed against the Muslim establishment, criticized the Islamic community for 
departing from the true teachings of Islam, demanded the implementation of sheriat 
law in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and implicitly threatened to form a parallel Islamic 
community dedicated to Wahhabist beliefs.  
Barčić was a reckless driver with a lengthy history of traffic violations. According to 
some journalists’ reports, his driving record derived from his rejection of all civil 
authority, including traffic regulations, and he routinely ran red lights. On March 30 
he lost control of the Mazda he was driving and ran headlong into a light post just 
outside the eastern Bosnian town of Tuzla. He died a few hours later of head injuries 
sustained in the crash. An estimated 3,000 Wahhabis came from near and far to attend 
his funeral in Tuzla and turned the occasion into a rally for their cause. Some 
mourners skirmished with police, who were unprepared to handle such a large crowd. 
Barčić’s truncated career as a Wahhabist gadfly thus evoked a greater response on his 
death than during his life and served mainly to bring Wahhabism sharply into public 
focus. The Islamic community reacted belatedly to Wahhabism, more in response to 
threats to its own power than to Bosniaks’ near-universal revulsion to Muslim 
fundamentalism.  
On April 17, less than three weeks after Barčić’s funeral, police in the Republic of 
Serbia raided a small camp of Wahhabis in the Sandžak region, home to tens of 
thousands of Serbia’s Bosniak minority. The police arrested three men but failed to 
locate a fourth member of the group. Three days later, Serbian security forces 
surrounded a small house occupied by four Wahhabis, including the fugitive from 
their previous raid. The house’s occupants opened fire on the police, who killed the 
group’s leader Prentić, injured another, and saw one of their own slightly wounded. 
Only three weeks before the killing, the Kosovo Police Service had issued a warrant 
for Ismail Prentić, brother of the slain Wahhabi leader, for smuggling weapons across 
the administrative boundary between Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia. The episode 
thus highlighted the Wahhabist movement’s cross-boundary linkages. Sandžak Mufti 
Muamer Zukorlić estimated that there were 150 Wahhabis in the Sandžak, of whom 
“fifteen to thirty are problematic,” that is, violence-prone. He noted that the Sandžak 
Wahhabis looked to Bosnian Wahhabis as their leaders and organizers. 
 
The response to the attacks demonstrated the Islamic community’s contempt for 
violence-prone Wahhabis. Tellingly, no Bosniak leader publicly defended the 
Wahhabis after the Serbian police attack, although several used the incident to blame 
Albanian radicalization on maltreatment by Serbian security forces. Imam Zukorlić 
alleged that Serbian security forces had instigated the Wahhabi challenges to the 
established Islamic community of Serbia, and Social Democratic leader Rasim Ljajić 
highlighted the “irrationality and futility of their alleged mission.” Although they did 
not endorse the Serbian police raid, neither secular Bosniaks nor leaders of the Islamic 
community identified with those attacked, arrested, or killed in the raids. 
Wahhabis have also made advances in Kosovo, but as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they 
are socially ostracized, despised by most Kosovars and the governing political parties, 
and operate outside the indigenous Islamic community. In December 2006 I visited 
Kosovo and interviewed local political and religious leaders. In one interview, I asked 
a group of Albanian veterans of the 1999 war if they had Islamic fundamentalists in 
their midst. No, they emphatically replied. They told me of two houses in the town of 
Gjilan where foreign Islamic radicals and their local converts lived. These radicals 
could be identified by their long beards and short pants. They attracted converts 
mainly by offering courses in foreign languages, particularly English, to Kosovar 
Albanians. Two of the interviewees told me of male acquaintances who had taken 
English lessons, delved into religious instruction, begun sporting beards, and 
eventually disappeared altogether, presumably to join Islamic radicals fighting in 
Afghanistan or Iraq. My interviewees viewed this as a tragedy; they expressed fears 
that such recruitment would spread. They emphasized that Albanian nationalists 
detest Islamic radicalism and fear its potential to send Albanians off to foreign wars as 
well as to threaten tranquility at home. 
Serbian Orthodoxy 
In the era of symbolic sublimation, the Serbian Orthodox Church has continued to be 
a central actor in advancing Serb nationalism. As Serbs in the Republic of Serbia have 
become consumed with the issue of Kosovo’s future, high church officials have 
continued to highlight their case for keeping Kosovo’s patrimonial sites under the 
jurisdiction of the Serbian state. Vladika Vasilije Kačavenda of the Zvornik-Tuzla 
Episcopate in Bosnia-Herzegovina left his headquarters in Tuzla in 1992 for the 
Bosnian Serb-controlled town of Bijeljina and built a palatial residence on Bosniak-
owned land.  
Since moving to Bijeljina, Kačavenda has made a career of building churches in his 
Episcopate on Bosniak-owned land and has succeeded in getting legislation 
introduced in the Republika Srpska legalizing such appropriations. He has publicly 
denounced a prominent Serb dissident living in Bijeljina who spoke out against Serb 
nationalist extremists, and used the occasion of a funeral to threaten the man publicly 
with retaliation. Kačavenda is among the most radical Serbian Orthodox clerics in 
having used his clerical office to incite nationalist confrontations, but he is not alone. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church, as it has for decades, continues to be a major force for 
incendiary Serb nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo.  
Conclusion 
 
Ethno-national competition, conducted or controlled by the leading nationalist parties 
and their allied religious communities, remains the principal trait of democratic-era 
politics in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian Orthodox and Islamic 
religious communities have been major contributors to the rhetoric, mobilization 
campaigns, and electoral successes of nationalists in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Kosovo, but they have consistently supported rather than 
challenged the dominant role of secular nationalist political parties. Bosnia’s Islamic 
religious community and secular Bosniak politicians tolerated mujahedin during 
wartime and after the war turned a blind eye to the gradual growth of Islamic 
fundamentalism on the fringes of Bosnian and Kosovar society. But in guarding their 
monopolistic positions, Islamic religious communities in Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina have begun to confront fundamentalism head-on and challenge further 
inroads. Given the absence of internal deterrents to extreme nationalism and the 
weakness of external constraints, the Serbian Orthodox Church poses as great a threat 
to long-term political stability and reconciliation in the two regions as do 
marginalized Islamic fundamentalists. 
 
